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Abstract—Adversarial examples of deep neural networks have
been actively investigated on image-based classification, segmen-
tation and detection tasks. However, adversarial robustness of
video models still lacks exploration. While several studies have
proposed how to generate adversarial videos, only a handful
of approaches pertaining to the defense strategies have been
published in the literature. Furthermore, these defense methods
are limited to a single perturbation type and often fail to
provide robustness to `p-bounded attacks and physically real-
izable attacks simultaneously. In this paper, we propose one
of the first defense solutions against multiple adversarial video
types for video classification. The proposed approach performs
adversarial training with multiple types of video adversaries
using independent batch normalizations (BNs), and recognizes
different adversaries by an adversarial video detector. During
inference, a switch module sends an input to a proper batch
normalization branch according to the detected attack type.
Compared to conventional adversarial training, our method
exhibits stronger robustness to multiple and even unforeseen
adversarial videos and provides higher classification accuracy.
Index Terms—Adversarial video, adversarial robustness, phys-
ically realizable attack, multiple perturbations.
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENT advances in deep learning have led deep neuralnetworks (DNNs) to perform outstandingly well in many
computer vision problems [1]–[3], including tasks such as
video classification [4]–[6]. However, researchers have shown
that DNNs are easily misled when presented by adversarial
examples [7], [8]. This is commonly done by adding carefully
crafted perturbations to the input data. Various approaches
have also been proposed in the literature to defend against
such adversarial attacks [9]–[15]. Among them, adversarial
training [10], [11], [15] is shown to provide stronger robust-
ness especially to the more challenging white-box and adaptive
attacks [16]. As a result, adversarial training has been used as
the foundation for more advanced defense techniques. Most
recent research in this area has focused on static images.
Generating adversarial examples and defense methods for
videos is relatively less explored. Although a few recent works
have extended adversarial attacks to videos [17]–[21], we are
aware of only two studies so far which delve into detecting or
defending against adversarial videos [22], [23]. AdvIT [23] is
one of the first adversarial frame detectors based on temporal
consistency for videos. However, their approach only detects
whether a video has been attacked or not. It does not provide
any defense mechanism against the attacked videos. Jia et al.
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[22] leveraged denoising and frame reconstruction for defense.
However, it is not clear how well their defense method works
on white-box attacks as it was not reported in [22].
On the other hand, conventional adversarial training usually
leads to performance degradation on clean data [10], [15].
Xie et al. [24] indicated that this problem is due to the
distribution mismatch between clean and adversarial examples.
In order to deal with this issue, they leveraged an auxiliary
batch normalization (BN) layer [25] to disentangle the two
distributions. In addition, most existing adversarial training
techniques are generally tailored to one specific perturbation
type, e.g., a certain `p-norm perturbation [11], [26], [27] or
physical attacks [28]. A model trained on a specific attack can
improve its robustness to that particular attack but often fails
to defend when presented with a sample that is perturbed by
a different type of attack [29]. Trame`r et al. [30] performed
multi-perturbation adversarial training by using Avg and Max
strategy towards robustness to different types of `p pertur-
bations. However, this work does not consider how well it
performs on clean images and on unforeseen attack types. In
a real-world application, the input data could be clean (i.e.,
unattacked), adversarial, or even attacked with a novel attack
type that the network has never seen before.
In this paper, we propose one of the first and novel defense
solutions for defending against adversarial videos for video
classification in the white-box setting, while also considering
the accuracy on clean samples as well as the robustness to
multiple known and unforeseen perturbations. Specifically, we
consider four of the most significant types of attacks: projec-
tive gradient descent (PGD) [11], rectangular occlusion attack
(ROA) [28], adversarial framing (AF) [21] and the proposed
salt-and-pepper attack (SPA). Fig. 1 gives an illustration of
these attacks on video frames. PGD and ROA are originally
designed to attack images. We first extend them to videos
by perturbing each frame and unveil that video classification
models are also vulnerable to these attacks. SPA is a new video
attack we design, which looks like salt-and-pepper noise. PGD
and SPA belong to the `p-bounded attack group while ROA
and AF belong to the physically realizable attack group. We
select one from each group as the known attack type (PGD
and ROA) and leave the others as the unforeseen attack type
(AF and SPA), where only the known attacks are used for
adversarial training. We aim to defend against all of these
attacks while retaining the performance on clean samples
simultaneously.
First, we demonstrate that training models on a specific
attack can gain robustness to that attack and sometimes to
another attack in the same group, but typically cannot defend
against the attacks in another group. Training models on mul-
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2Fig. 1: Illustration of the four types of adversarial videos we consider on the UCF101 dataset [31]. Top to bottom: Three
selected frames from a video. Left to right: Examples of clean, PGD, ROA, AF and SPA attacks.
tiple attacks together (multi-perturbation training) improves
multi-perturbation robustness, yet accuracy on clean samples
is sacrificed. This is mainly due to the distribution mismatch
among clean and different types of adversarial examples. We
assume that the attacks in the same group have a relatively sim-
ilar distribution. Therefore, inspired by [24], [32], we employ
three BNs in a model: for the clean, `p-norm and physically
realizable attack examples, individually. Models are trained
on these three types of data with their corresponding BN
branches. Meanwhile, we create an adversarial video detector
to recognize the adversarial group of input videos. During
inference, a switch module sends the input to a BN branch ac-
cording to its group. Compared to the conventional adversarial
training and multi-perturbation training, experimental results
show that the proposed method achieves stronger robustness
to multiple, more diverse and even unforeseen perturbations,
while retaining higher accuracy on clean samples.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a novel defense solution based on a multi-BN
structure with a new training scheme and an adversarial
video detector. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first defense method against white-box adversarial videos.
• This is the first work to defend against `p-norm, phys-
ically realizable attacks as well as unforeseen attacks
simultaneously.
• The proposed method achieves both stronger multi-
perturbation robustness and better clean sample perfor-
mance than conventional adversarial training and multi-
perturbation training.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review some prior works on adversarial
videos, adversarial training, and physically realizable attacks.
1) Adversarial Video: Most of the existing literature on
adversarial attacks and defense are based on static images.
There are only a few works that address attacks and defense
techniques for videos. Wei et al. [20] are the first ones to
explore adversarial examples in videos. They found that per-
turbations propagate through video frames in the CNN+RNN
based video classifier [5], and thus propose a temporally sparse
attack. Li et al. [18] generated video attacks by a generative
model. Zajac et al. [21] developed an attack that keeps frames
unchanged and just attaches an adversarial frames on the
border of each video frame. Jiang et al. [17] introduced V-
BAD for black-box video attacks.
Currently, we are aware of only two studies for detecting or
defending against video attacks. Xiao et al. [23] proposed Ad-
vIT based on temporal consistency to detect adversarial frames
within a video. However, their approach only detects whether
a video has been attacked or not. It does not provide any
defense mechanism against the attacked videos. Jia et al. [22]
presented a similar detector, along with a temporal defense and
a spatial defense. The temporal defense reconstructs perturbed
frames with adjacent clean frames. The spatial defense uses
and denoises the reconstructed frames to mitigate the effect
of adversarial perturbations. However, their approach is only
3evaluated on the black-box attack setting. It is not clear how
well their defense method works on white-box attacks [16] as
it was not reported in [22]. In this paper, we provide the first
defense solution against white-box adversarial videos.
2) Adversarial Training: Adversarial training is currently
considered the most effective defense approach against ad-
versarial perturbations, particularly for the white-box attacks.
Goodfellow et al. [7] first proposed this strategy. They trained
DNNs with both clean images and adversarial images to
improve adversarial robustness. Madry et al. [11] viewed ad-
versarial training from a perspective of min-max optimization,
training models with solely adversarial images. It has held
great promise and has been widely used as a benchmark. Xie et
al. [15] developed a feature denoising block, which increases
the network capability of handling adversarial training. Xie
et al. [23], [32] also demonstrated that proper normalization
management is paramount for enhancing the robustness and
for even improving the model performance. Trame`r et al. [30]
investigated adversarial robustness to multiple perturbations,
including `∞, `2, `1 and rotation-translation attacks, and
provided the Max and the Avg adversarial training schemes.
Nevertheless, this study does not take potential unforeseen
attack types and clean images into consideration. Our proposed
defense is based on adversarial training and manages normal-
ization to enhance the robustness to multiple, more diverse and
even unforeseen perturbations, while retaining higher accuracy
on clean images simultaneously.
3) Physical Attacks: The physical attack is a class of
adversarial attacks that can be implemented in the physical
space. The physically realizable attack refers to the digital
representation of physical attacks. Such attacks fool DNNs
by modifying physical objects being photographed. Sharif
et al. [33] generated printable perturbations inside eyeglass
frames to attack face recognition systems. Brown et al. [34]
created an adversarial patch that can be put next to a real-
world object, making that object be misclassified. Thys et
al. [35] further extended the adversarial patch to fooling
human detectors. Wu et al. [28] proposed DOA, a pioneering
defense against physically realizable attacks. DOA performs
adversarial training with rectangular occlusion attack (ROA),
which places an adversarial rectangular sticker on an image,
improving physical robustness. However, it fails to resist `p-
bounded attacks. Our work extends ROA/DOA to videos and
shows robustness to both `p-bounded and physically realizable
attacks.
III. MULTIPLE ADVERSARIAL VIDEO TYPES
For our investigation, we construct four types of video
attacks: `∞-norm PGD [11], ROA [28], AF [21], and a new
SPA attack (see Fig. 1). Among them, `∞-norm PGD and SPA
(`0-norm) belong to the `p-bounded attacks, and ROA and AF
belong to the physically realizable attacks. In our experiments,
we set PGD and ROA as the known attack types used for
training, while AF and SPA are used as unforeseen attack types
that are only used during inference. We aim to defend against
multiple adversarial video types, including `p-bounded and
physically realizable attacks as well as known and unforeseen
attacks. All of these attacks are set to untargeted since the
untargeted attack is considered more difficult to defend against
than the targeted attack.
1) Projective Gradient Descent: PGD attack is defined as
xt+1 = Πx+S
(
xt + α sgn(5xL(x, y; θ))
)
(1)
where x is a data sample, y is the ground-truth label, θ is
model parameters, L is the training loss, and S denotes the set
of allowed perturmations. The perturbation size  is described
as ‖ xT − x ‖p≤ , where T denotes the maximum interation
number. PGD is a powerful multi-step variant of the Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [7]. It has become one of the
most important benchmarks in the current adversarial example
research [15], [28], [32].
We extend the `∞-norm PGD from images to videos by
taking the gradient descent with respect to an entire input
video. We set the perturbation size  = 4, the number of
iterations n = 5, and step size α = 1, for both adversarial
training and evaluation.
2) Rectangular Occlusion Attack: ROA attack introduces
`∞-norm PGD inside a fixed-size and fixed location rectangle
on an image. The size is pre-defined and the location is
searched with respect to the highest loss. We extend ROA
to videos, in which each frame is perturbed by a rectangle. To
save computations, we skip the location search step. Instead,
we randomly assign the rectangle location for each video
frame and then apply PGD on it. We set the rectangle size
equal to 30×30 with PGD setting  = 255, n = 5, and α =
70, for both adversarial training and evaluation.
3) Adversarial Framing: AF attack adds adversarial fram-
ings on the border of each video frame while most of the
frame pixels are not modified. It is originally designed as a
universal attack. To save computations, we perform a non-
universal version by first fixing the framing location and then
applying PGD inside it. We set the framing width equal to
10 with PGD setting  = 255, n = 5, and α = 70, for both
adversarial training and evaluation.
4) Salt-and-pepper Attack: Inspired by the one-pixel attack
[36], we design a new video attack. For computation saving,
instead of using differential evolution, we randomly select a
pre-defined number of pixels on each video frame, then apply
PGD on those pixels. We consider it as a kind of `0-norm
attack because the number of adversarial pixels is bounded.
We name this new attack salt-and-pepper attack (SPA), as
the perturbations look like salt-and-pepper noise. We set the
number of adversarial pixels on each frame equal to 100 with
PGD setting  = 255, n = 5, and α = 70, for both adversarial
training and evaluation.
IV. DEFENSE AGAINST ADVERSARIAL VIDEOS
In real-world applications, the input data could be clean
(i.e. unattacked), adversarial, or even attacked with a novel
attack that the network has never seen before. As a result, it is
important to design a defense solution that can resist to mul-
tiple known and unforeseen perturbations while retaining the
performance on clean samples. In this section, we first revisit
adversarial training and multi-perturbation training schemes,
4and then introduce the proposed method which is based on
multiple BNs and an adversarial video detector. Fig. 2 gives
an overview of the proposed approach.
A. Adversarial Training
To begin with, we recall the objective function for training
a DNN model
θ∗ = arg min
θ
E(x,y)∼D [L(x, y; θ)] , (2)
where x is a clean training sample with ground-truth label y
in the training set D, θ is model parameters, and L denotes the
training loss. Madry’s adversarial training [11] applies the min-
max optimization and trains models exclusively on adversarial
examples
θ∗ = arg min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
L(x+ δ, y; θ)
]
, (3)
where δ denotes an adversarial perturbation in the perturbation
set S. AdaProp [24] aims to improve the performance on clean
samples and trains the model with a mixture of clean data and
adversarial examples as follows
θ∗ = arg min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
L(x, y; θ) + max
δ∈S
L(x+ δ, y; θ)
]
.
(4)
Regarding multi-perturbation robustness, Trame`r et al. [30]
introduce two adversarial training strategies: Avg strategy and
Max strategy. Avg strategy trains on all types of adversarial ex-
amples simultaneously and optimizes these adversarial losses
together as follows
θ∗ = arg min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
N∑
i=1
max
δi∈Si
L(x+ δi, y; θ)
]
, (5)
where N is the number of perturbation types. Max strategy
considers the worse-case attack. It trains on the strongest
adversarial example that obtains the maximum loss among all
types of attacks
θ∗ = arg min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δk∈Sk
L(x+ δk, y; θ)
]
, (6)
where
k = arg max
i∈[1,N ]
[
max
δi∈Si
L(x+ δi, y; θ)
]
, (7)
which denotes the strongest type of attacks. With this back-
ground, in what follows, we elaborate on our proposed training
scheme which is based on a multiple BN structure.
B. Multi-BN Structure
The adversarial training on a single perturbation type is
generally weakly robust to the other types of attacks. On
the other hand, most current state-of-the-art computer vision
DNNs contain BNs [25] in their architecture to normalize input
features, which improves the performance [3], [6]. However,
because of the different distributions among multiple pertur-
bation types, BNs suffer from the distribution mismatch when
multi-perturbation training is conducted, and thus fails to gain
promising multi-perturbation robustness.
To address this problem, we deploy multiple BN branches
into each BN layer of the target model and keep the rest of
the parts unchanged, i.e., still a single network [24], [32].
Clean data and each perturbation type we use for training
are assigned an individual BN branch. Each BN branch
is only responsible to estimate one or similar distributions,
and thus can properly disentangle multiple distributions. At
each mini-batch training step, each perturbation attacks the
model through its assigned BN branch. Then we send these
adversarial and clean mini-batches to their corresponding BN
branch and compute the loss. The objective function is defined
as follows
θ∗ = arg min
θ
E
(x,y)∼D[
L(x, y; θc, θb0) +
N∑
i=1
max
δi∈Si
L(x+ δi, y; θ
c, θbi )
]
,
(8)
where θc is convolution parameters, θbi is the BN parameters
of the i-th data type, and θ = θc +
∑N
i=0 θ
b
i denotes all the
model parameters.
In practical scenarios, DNNs have to be able to provide
robustness against unforeseen attacks. An exhaustive investi-
gation is too expensive; instead, we can summarize different
attack types into several groups based on their distributions,
then build a BN branch for each group. In our case, we
adopt three BN branches: for clean data, `p-norm attacks and
physically realizable attacks (see Fig. 2). Typically, adversarial
training on a strong and well-designed attack has better
robustness [11]. According to our analysis in Sec.V-B, PGD
and ROA are a better `p-norm attack and a better physically
realizable attack, respectively for adversarial training among
the four types of attacks we consider. Therefore, we train
models on clean, PGD, and ROA examples using the 3-BN
structure with Eq. (8), where N = 2.
C. Adversarial Video Detector
During inference, the input data must be fed to the corre-
sponding BN branch. Hence, an automatic switch mechanism
is needed. To this end, we propose to use a video classification-
based adversarial video detector which not only identifies
whether an input video is clean or adversarial, but also
recognizes the attack type. Then a switch module sends the
input to a proper BN branch according to the detection result
(see Fig. 2). The adversarial video detector is a N + 1 class
classifier, where N is the number of attack types used for
training. We employ a 3D CNN architecture [6] and train it
end-to-end.
For our case, the detector is trained by N = 2 on clean,
PGD and ROA examples to recognize clean data, `p-bounded
attacks and physically realizable attacks. For the unforeseen
attacks, the detector would classify them into the most similar
group on the basis of Softmax probabilities. Our experiments
in Sec.V-B demonstrate that AF videos and SPA videos are
mostly classified into the `p-bounded group and the physically
realizable group, respectively, which is tailored to our system
5Fig. 2: An overview of the proposed framework for defense.
design though these examples are not used for training. We are
aware that vigorously classifying an unforeseen class as one of
the known classes is not a proper solution. However, since our
ultimate purpose is defense, this is exactly what we want in
our specific case. Applying an open-set recognition algorithm
[37], [38] to make the detector classify the unforeseen attck
types is left for future work.
V. EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate the robustness of our method to the four
considered perturbation types as well as its performance on
clean data. In this section, we first describe our experimental
setup. Next, we report the evaluation results of the proposed
method. Finally, an ablation study is conducted to analyze
different components of our method.
A. Experimental Setup
1) Implementation Details: We choose 3D ResNext-101
and 3D Wide ResNet-50 [6] as our target models, as they
are two of the most top-performing 3D CNNs for video
classification. We adopt the pre-trained models from [6] and
conduct adversarial training to fine-tune them in end-to-end.
SGD optimizer is used for all models with inital learning
rate 0.0005, momentum 0.9, and weight decay 1e−5. For
our adversarial video detector, we employ the lightweight 3D
ResNet-50 and train it with the same training protocol as
mentioned above. We apply the union accuracy to evaluate
the multi-perturbation robustness. The union accuracy requires
that the target models need to correctly classify an input
sample under all the considered input types.
2) Dataset: We train and evaluate our method on UCF101
[31], a widely used video dataset in action recognition. It
consists of 13,320 videos with 101 action classes. The dataset
splits 9,537 videos for training and 3,783 videos for testing.
We use the whole training set to train the target models and
the whole test set for evaluation. For training our adversarial
video detector, 3,733 videos are selected from the training set
to construct a self-made 11,199-video set containing clean,
PGD and ROA classes with an equal number of videos. The
frame dimensinos are 112×112. Following [20], we uniformly
sample each video into 40 frames.
B. Evaluation of the 3-BN Structure
We evaluate both the robustness and the performance of
the proposed 3-BN training scheme on 3D ResNext-101. We
compare it with conventional adversarial training [11] as well
as the Avg and Max multi-perturbation training strategies
[30]. Different from [30], we take the clean sample accuracy
into consideration. For a fair comparison, we adjust the Avg
and Max strategies by involving clean data in training. In
particular, we add the clean data loss L(x, y; θ) into the
expectation of objective functions Eq. (5) and Eq. (6).
Table I shows that models trained on a specific attack have
the best robustness to that attack compared to the other single
attack trained model. PGDAT and ROAAT also yield high
robustness to another attacks in their own group, showing
better generalization. However, all of them almost fail to
defend against the attacks from other groups. AvgMPT and
MaxMPT that use multi-perturbation training achieve better
multi-perturbation robustness, yet their performance on clean
data is not promising owing to the distribution mismatch.
We can see that the proposed 3BNsMPT substantially
outperforms AvgMPT and MaxMPT on both clean and adver-
sarial data. Our method achieves higher accuracies on every
input type and obtains the best mean accuracy and union
accuracy. The evaluation on 3D Wide ResNet-50 is reported
in Table II. Again, our 3BNsMPT achieves significantly better
performance and robustness.
6TABLE I: Evaluation results on 3D ResNext-101. Clean model is trained on only clean data. AT and MAT denote adversarial
training and multi-perturbation training, respectively. PGDAT , ROAAT , AFAT and SPAAT are models trained on a single
attack, while AvgMPT and MaxMPT are trained on multiple attacks using Avg and Max strategies. 3BNsMPT is our 3-BN
structure with MPT. ”Mean” and ”Union” are the mean accuracy (%) and the union accuracy (%), respectively, over all the
five input types. The best results are in bold, and the best results among MPT methods are underlined.
Model Clean PGD ROA AF SPA Mean Union
Clean 89.0 3.3 0.5 1.6 8.4 20.6 0.0
PGDAT 78.6 49.0 5.0 0.6 67.1 40.1 0.3
ROAAT 82.6 12.5 69.0 54.0 17.6 47.1 7.9
AFAT 84.6 7.1 3.9 80.5 12.2 37.7 2.1
SPAAT 83.5 36.9 2.6 0.7 69.5 38.6 0.2
AvgMPT 68.9 38.1 51.4 18.5 49.6 45.3 17.3
MaxMPT 72.8 32.5 31.0 5.8 49.4 38.3 5.5
3BNsMPT 83.7 46.4 65.6 57.0 60.4 62.6 40.7
TABLE II: Evaluation results on 3D Wide ResNet-50. Clean model is trained with only clean data. MAT denotes multi-
perturbation training. AvgMPT and MaxMPT are models trained on multiple attacks using Avg and Max strategies. 3BNsMPT
is our 3-BN structure with MPT. ”Mean” and ”Union” are the mean accuracy (%) and the union accuracy (%), respectively,
over all the five input types. The best results are in bold, and the best results among MPT methods are underlined.
Model Clean PGD ROA AF SPA Mean Union
Clean 88.4 11.5 0.2 1.0 10.0 22.2 0.0
AvgMPT 74.5 43.1 55.6 3.5 57.2 46.8 3.5
MaxMPT 76.0 32.5 12.2 2.3 39.2 32.4 1.9
3BNsMPT 83.1 44.0 63.8 57.4 61.6 62.0 39.5
TABLE III: Performance of each BN branch on the five input
types. CleanBN , PGDBN and ROABN are the clean, PGD and
ROA BN branches in the 3-BN structure, respectively.
BN Branch Clean PGD ROA AF SPA
CleanBN 83.7 21.3 13.5 5.9 23.8
PGDBN 79.0 46.4 7.7 1.9 60.4
ROABN 83.0 23.5 65.6 57.0 26.6
C. Ablation on Differnt BN Branches
In the previous section, the attacker generates perturbations
through the BN branch corresponding to its type. During
inference, the input is also sent to that BN branch accordingly.
In this section, we investigate the cases that perturbations are
produced on a BN branch which is different from the group of
the used attack type, and the input is sent to that BN branch
during inference.
As can be seen in Table III, each BN branch performs the
best on the input type which they are trained on. Moreover, for
the unforeseen attacks, PGDBN is the most robust to SPA, and
ROABN is the most robust to AF. This result is consistent to
our hypothesis that feeding an unforeseen adversarial example
to the BN branch of the same or the most similar group
can enjoy the best benefit. Our grouping is based on the
observation that PGD and SPA have similar distributions (`p-
bounded attacks), and ROA and AF have similar distributions
(physically realizable attacks) is also confirmed.
D. Ablation on Target BN and Inference BN
Next, we further delve into the cases that an adversarial
example is made inference on a BN branch (inference BN)
different from the BN branch that is used to generate the
adversarial example (target BN). In other words, we consider
the cases that the target BN and the inference BN are different.
The results shown in Table IV are consistent with Table III
in general, in which PGDBN has the strongest robustness to
`p-bounded attacks, and ROABN has the strongest robustness
to physically realizable attacks. PGD attack is an exception.
When the target BN is PGDBN , inference PGDBN performs
the worst.
In addition, we observe that for any specific inference BN,
it is more robust to the adversarial examples generated on
another BN branch, i.e., target BN and inference BN are
different. In such a case, the attack is not a rigorous white-box
attack, so we treat it as a kind of gray-box attack, in which the
attacker does not know which BN branch would adversarial
examples will be sent to during inference. This result unveils
that the attacks cannot perfectly transfer to other BN branches
even though the rest of the model parameters are shared in
the same network. Meanwhile, the robustness of the proposed
3-BN framework to this gray-box attack is demonstrated, and
thus its black-box robustness is also optimistic.
E. Equipping Automatic Switch
Now we equip the 3-BN structure with the adversarial video
detector and a switch module, making a complete system. We
7TABLE IV: Results of the cases that the target BN and the inference BN are different. ”Attack” refers to the attack type, ”Inf”
refers to the inference BN (in rows), and ”Target” refers to the target BN (in columns).
Attack PGD ROA
Inf \ Target CleanBN PGDBN ROABN CleanBN PGDBN ROABN
CleanBN 21.3 50.9 35.9 13.5 17.9 56.6
PGDBN 72.6 46.4 70.5 30.4 7.7 48.2
ROABN 46.4 52.3 23.5 78.5 76.4 65.6
Attack AF SPA
Inf \ Target CleanBN PGDBN ROABN CleanBN PGDBN ROABN
CleanBN 5.9 7.3 49.0 23.8 55.7 41.8
PGDBN 16.4 1.9 33.5 77.2 60.4 75.8
ROABN 75.2 62.5 57.0 49.8 57.4 26.6
Fig. 3: Illustration of the adversarial videos generated under Case B. Top to bottom: Three selected frames from a video. Left
to right: Examples of clean, PGD, ROA, AF and SPA attacks
TABLE V: Evaluation results on the 3-BN framework of 3D ResNext-101 equipped with the adversarial video detector. Case
Z corresponds to the case when the adversarial video detector has a perfect prediction, which corresponds to Table 1. The
numbers in parentheses are the detection accuracies (%) of the adversarial video detector.
Case Clean PGD ROA AF SPA Mean Union
Z 83.7 46.4 65.6 57.0 60.4 62.6 40.7
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
A 83.1 48.5 67.4 58.8 61.1 63.8 42.5
(83.5) (97.1) (100.0) (100.0) (96.9) (95.5)
B 83.1 82.9 75.7 75.9 75.0 78.5 63.0
(83.5) (23.7) (0.0) (99.8) (59.1) (53.2)
8TABLE VI: Evaluation results on the 3-BN framework of 3D Wide ResNet-50 equipped with the adversarial video detector.
Case Z corresponds to the case when the adversarial video detector has a perfect prediction, which corresponds to Table 1.
The numbers in parentheses are the detection accuracies (%) of the adversarial video detector.
Case Clean PGD ROA AF SPA Mean Union
Z 83.1 44.0 63.8 57.4 61.6 62.0 39.5
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
A 82.2 46.4 65.2 58.5 61.4 62.7 40.2
(90.9) (95.7) (100.0) (100.0) (86.1) (94.5)
B 82.2 82.0 72.9 75.2 72.2 76.9 60.0
(90.9) (15.1) (0.0) (99.8) (47.8) (50.7)
TABLE VII: Evaluation results under the first set of stronger attacks. PGD† is PGD attack with  = 8, ROA† is ROA attack
with rectangle size 45×45, AF† is AF attack with framing width 15, and SPA† is SPA attack with 200 adversarial pixels on
each frame. The best results are in bold.
Model Clean PGD† ROA† AF† SPA† Mean Union
Clean 89.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 18.8 0.0
AvgMPT 68.9 33.1 29.9 17.2 36.1 37.1 13.1
MaxMPT 72.8 27.5 8.6 3.6 32.2 28.9 2.0
3BNsMPT 83.7 40.3 42.8 52.6 44.3 52.7 27.1
TABLE VIII: Evaluation results under the second set of stronger attacks. PGD‡ is PGD attack with  = 16, ROA‡ is ROA
attack with rectangle size 60×60, AF‡ is AF attack with framing width 25, and SPA‡ is SPA attack with 400 adversarial pixels
on each frame. The best results are in bold.
Model Clean PGD‡ ROA‡ AF‡ SPA‡ Mean Union
Clean 89.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 18.2 0.0
AvgMPT 68.9 30.2 12.7 5.6 17.3 26.9 2.4
MaxMPT 72.8 24.6 0.6 0.6 12.7 22.3 0.1
3BNsMPT 83.7 37.9 20.7 23.8 21.0 37.4 6.7
consider two white-box attack cases to evaluate the composite:
• Case A: The attacker is able to access the target model
directly and is fully aware of the switch codes. In other
words, the attacker can attack through any target BN
he/she likes. To compare with Table I, we set the target
BN corresponding to the attack type and set inference
BN to the same as the target BN.
• Case B: The composite is treated as a complete single
system. The attacker can access the entire system but
cannot access the inner component. In other words, the
attacker generates perturbations by the gradients of the
entire end-to-end system. The target BN and the inference
BN depend on the prediction of the adversarial video
detector.
We report the results in Table V. Case Z is assuming the
adversarial video detector has a perfect prediction, which is
actually the same case as in Table I that we send inputs to
BN branches manually. We put it here for comparison. The
accuracy of the detector in Case A is equivalent to the standard
evolution on it since the generated perturbations do not depend
on the detector. We can see that our detector achieves good
performance (95.5%). For the target model in Case A, the
clean accuracy is slightly lower, the reason is that some of the
clean videos are mis-detected to the PGD class. Recall our
results in Table III, PGDBN performs worse on clean data
than CleanBN . On the other hand, some PGD data are mis-
detected to the clean class, which causes a gray-box attack, so
the accuracy becomes higher.
Moving to Case B, the clean data inference accuracy and
detection accuracy of Case B is the same as Case A since
the difference between these two cases is only on perturbation
generation. On the other hand, in Case B, we observe that the
detection accuracies are significantly lower for perturbations
(even 0% for ROA). Most of the adversarial examples are
mis-detected to the clean class. Meanwhile, the inference
accuracies are higher for all perturbation types. The reason
is that it is more difficult to generate adversarial examples
by using the gradients obtained from the whole system. The
produced perturbations are weak and thus can bypass the
adversarial video detector, but they cause just a weak threat
against the target model accordingly.
Fig. 3 illustrates some examples of the adversarial videos
generated under Case B. As can be seen from this figure,
they look different from Fig. 1. In this case, PGD examples
9are almost identical to clean data, so PGD inference accuracy
is very close to clean accuracy. ROA examples are with
gray rectangles nearly unchanged from the initialization, and
thus mostly assigned to CleanBN by the detector. The gray
rectangles occlude objects. Therefore, sometimes they can also
fool the target model, making ROA inference accuracy lower
than clean accuracy. AF examples remain perturbations on the
framings, so they can still be detected by the adversarial video
detector. Neverthelss, the perturbations become much weaker,
so AF inference accuracy increses. SPA examples are basically
with just black holes, and they are weaker adversaries. Hence,
SPA inference accuracy becomes higher. Based on the above
observations, the composite of the 3-BN structure and the
adversarial video detector makes it difficult for attackers to
produce adversarial videos in Case B. This indicates that the
proposed method can further enhance the robustness in certain
cases.
We also evaluate on 3D Wide ResNet-50. Again, the de-
tector architecture is based on 3D ResNet-50 and is trained
on the clean videos as well as the PGD and ROA adversarial
videos generated on the target model. We report the results
in Table VI. These results are consistent with the case of 3D
ResNeXt-101 in Table V.
F. Evaluation on Stronger Attacks
In this section, we test the proposed 3-BN framework
(3BNsMPT ) on stronger adversarial attacks, and compare it
with Avg (AvgMPT ) and Max (MaxMPT ) strategies. These
models are identical to those in Table 1, in which they are
trained on clean data, PGD examples with perturbation size 
= 4, the number of iterations n = 5, and step size α = 1, and
ROA examples with rectangle size 30×30,  = 255, n = 5,
and α = 70 (see Sec. 3).
We establish two sets of stronger attacks. In the first set, we
increase  from 4 to 8 for PGD, rectangle size from 30×30
to 45×45 for ROA, framing width from 10 to 15 for AF, and
the number of adversarial pixels on each frame from 100 to
200 for SPA. In the second set, we further increase  to 16 for
PGD, rectangle size to 60×60 for ROA, framing width to 25
for AF, and the number of adversarial pixels on each frame to
400 for SPA.
As reported in Table VII and Table VIII, the proposed
3BNsMPT still achieves much better multi-perturbation ro-
bustness than AvgMPT and MaxMPT even when tested on
stronger attacks.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The adversarial robustness of video networks still lacks
exploration. Very few defense methods in the video domain
have been introduced. In this paper, we propose one of the first
defense solutions against adversarial videos based on a multi-
BN structure with a new training scheme and an adversarial
video detector. The proposed method can defend against `p-
norm attacks and physically realizable attacks simultaneously
in an unforeseen attack setting. Compared to conventional
adversarial training and multi-perturbation training, it provides
more promising clean data performance and multi-perturbation
robustness, simultaneously. We conduct an extensive ablation
study to analyze different cases. Furthermore, reducing the
expense of multi-perturbation training is also a challenge.
These issues are left for future work. Problems on adversarial
machine learning in videos and multi-perturbation robustness
are worth further exploration.
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